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CHECKS.
(Last sub-division.)
EXCUSES FOR NOT HONORING CHECK. EXCEEDS THE DEPOSIT.
The bank is not under obligation to pay a check or any part
of it, if it exceeds the amount on dedosit at the time of its
presentment. Yet in Bromley v. Commercial National Bank
of Penusylvania it is said by Pierce, J., that if the holder of
the check is willing to receive the smaller sum, the bank shoull
pay him it. The bank will retain the check, but should edidorse
upon it the amount paid and issue to the holder a certificate of
having received the check and of having paid so much upon it.
The holder may also deposit with the bank enough to equal the
check and, if he does so, the bank ought to pay the check.
DEPOSIT BELONGS TO ANOTHER.
When the bank receives from X a deposit and issues to him
the customary credential, it cannot refuse to pay it out to others
on his checks, or to pay it back to him on his check, payable to
himself, on the ground that the money really belongs to some
body else than X, unless the money in fact belongs to another,
and that other has notified the bank not to pay it to X, or,
'9 Phila. 522. Cf. Johnston v. Parker Savings Bank, 101 Pa., 597,
wh'ere it is suggested that a bank not having funds of the drawer of a
check may receive it and agree to hold it until funds come in, and then
to pay it. In Penn Bank's Assigned Estate, 165 Pa. 548, bank A had a
check for $88,000 on Bank B. which B could notpayin full. A agreed to
lend $40,000 to B to enable it to pay. The security for the loan Was notes
of the B bank's directors.
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unless, belonging to another, a creditor of that other has at-
attached it as his.2 The bank cannot, sua sjfonte, allege the
ownership of another, and for that reason, refuse to recognize
the right of the depositor to withdraw the money, even
though it has claims against the other, which, by retaining the
money, it might satisfy.' The money being deposited by T. H.
Patterson, "as agent," the bank must pay it to him, unless those
for whom he is agent have a right to the money, and notify it
not to pay it to him. The burden is on the bank to prove these
facts."
CHECKS NOT DRAWN BY PROPER PERSON.
If a partnership, A & B, make deposits, and the bank is
notified that all checks upon these deposits will be signed by both
partners, the bank will properly refuse to honor checks not so
signed, unless the partners waive the requirement. If the bank
pays out money on check, signed by A alone, it will not be en-
titled to credit, unless the money is actually used by A in legit-
imate partnership transactions, as against B, the other member
of the firm, or as against creditors of the firm who have attached
the deposit.' The fact that A makes deposit of B's money in
the bank informing the bank that it is B's, does not authorize A
to draw checks upon it in B's name. Authority to deposit is not
authority to draw out. Hence B can recover the money from
the bank notwithstanding that .the bank has paid it out on A's
check.' But the bank will be entitled to a credit for so much of
the money drawn out by A, as he has used in paying B's debts.
CHECKS REVOKED BY DEATH.
The death of a drawer of a check revokes it, so far as the
bank upon which it is drawn is concerned. The bank has no
right to pay it thereafter.' It seems, says Pierce, J., "that the
death of a drawer of a check is a countermand of the banker's au-
thority to pay it. But that if the banker do pay the check before
notice of the death, the payment is good.".
8  "Where a check is
2Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545; First Nat. Bank v. Mason, 95 Pa.
113.
395 Pa. 113.
4Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. 419.
5Smelting Co. v. Laverty, 159 Pa. 287.
6Fletcher v. Integrity Ins. Co. 31 W. N. 503; Kerr v Peoples' Bank,
158 Pa. 306.
7Saylor v. Bushong 100 Pa. 23.
8Bromley v. Nat. Bank, 9 Phila. 522.
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not. regarded as an assignment, it has been said that the death
of the drawer will work a revocation; but, notwithstanding this,
if a bank pay a check after the drawer's death, and before learn-
ing of the event, it is not liable. In those jurisdictions, however,
where the check operates as an assignment, it would seem that
the drawer's death would have no such effect."
CHECKS REVOKD- BY COUNTBRIIAND.
Until the bank upon which a check is drawn accepts it, cer-
tifies it, or in some way becomes bound to pay it, to the holder0 or
until the bank actually pays the check" it maybe countermanded
by the drawer, and payment of it, after such countermand, would
expose the bank to an action by the drawer, for the amount thus
paid out.' If however the bank pays the check before receiving
notice not to pay, it will be entitled to credit against the deposit
of the drawer. 3 Although stoppage of payment may injure
the holder, he will have no redress from the bank, e.g. in a
case in which the drawer become! insolvent, after the issue of the
check, and in which the payee if he does not secure payment ftom
the bank, will be unable to abtain it at all."4 Refusal to pay a
check after countermand of it, exposes the bank to no action by
the holder' but the drawer of the check remains liable upon it.'
CH=CK AS AN APPROPRIATION OR ASSIGNMENT.
That a depositor in a bank does not by the delivery of a check
drawn on the depositary bank to X assign so much of the deposit
as equals the amount of the check is well established. Such a
check is payable not simply from moneys at the time of its mak-
ing in the bank, but out of any that may be in the bank at the
95 Cyc. 540. It is said that the holder of a check ought to have a
remedy against the bank which refuses to pay it, if it has impliedly
promised by its usage, to pay checks. Saylor v. Bushong; 100 Pa. 23.
'0There can be no effectual countermand thereafter, Northumb-
erland Bank v. McMichae], 106 Pa. 460.
"After actual payment, there can be no countermand, 118 Pa. 294.
The holder of a check sues the bank on which it was drawn, alleging pay-
ment and, by means of a false pretext, the surrenderof the payment. The
alleged payment being found not to be a true payment, the action was
defeated.
"German Nat. Bank v. Farmers' D. Nat. Bank, 118 Pa. 294.
1Id.
'4100 Pa. 23.
"SaVlor v. Bushong, 100 Pa. 23.
'6Matthews v. Fcederer, 19 Phila. 295.
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time of its presentment for payment. It does not constitute the •
payee the owner of the money which is in the bank when it is
delivered, nor lessen the power or right of the drawer to make
some other appropriation of that money."' Hence, one who holds
a check, at the time when an attachment in execution against
the drawer attaching the bank deposit is served upon the bank,
which check has not been presented to the bank, is not entitled
to so much of the deposit as equals the check, or any less amount
of it, as against the attaching creditor. Check drawn October
23d. On October 27th a creditor of the drawer issues an attach-
ment execution which is served the same day on the bank. Two
days later the check is presented to the bank for payment. The
bank will properly refuse to .pay it. It will be obliged to pay
the attaching creditor, even though it pays the holder of the
check. 8 A draws a check upon his banker X, in favor of B.
The three agree that if any attachment should be'levied upon the
fund for A's debt, the amount of the check should be immediately
passed to B's credit, and a corresponding charge made against
A's account. An attachment execution subsequently issued, and
was served upon X, and thereupon X gave credit to B for the
amount of the check, and charged the amount against A's ac-
count. A had on deposit only $4,779.72 and the check was for
$10,000. The charging of the check against him made his
account overdrawn to the extent of $5,220.28. He made his
account good the same day by depositing this amount. It was
held that the attachment took the $4,779.72. The bank's agree-
ment to transfer the money to B, was not executed until after
the service of the attachment. The agreement itself was not
equivalent to an assignment. Nor did it raise a trust. If it
raised a trust it was a trust for the benefit of A, until the con-
tingency of the issue of the attachment. Although another per-
son might have created such a trust for A he could not do it
himself. The trust would be void, as to him, and also as to B. 19
"Loydv. McCaffrey46 Pa. 410; First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa.
94; Roberts v. Boyle, 8York 13; Brosius v. Cloud, 1 Ch. 333; Hemphill
v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545. But Bromley v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 9 Phila.
522, tacitly assumes that a check was an appropriation.
"8Kuhn v. Warren Saving Bank, 20 W. N. C. 230; Roberts v. Boyle,
8 York 13; Harry v. Wood, 2 Miles 327. If a check is payable to A
who endorses it to B prior to the service of an attachment on the bank,
for A's debt, B will be entitled to the money; Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132
Pa. 545.
"9Loyd v. McCaffrey 46 Pa. 410.
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COMPETITION BETWEEN HOLDER OF CHECK AND ASSIGNEE.
If after the delivery of a check by A he makes an assign-
ment in trust for the benefit of creditors, before the check is pre-
sented to the bank for payment, the money in the bank will be-
long to the assignee, and not to the holder of the check. Of
such a check, Sterrett, J., remarked: "It designated no particular
fund out of which it was to be paid; contained no words import-
ing a transfer of the whole or any part of the balance then stand-
ing to the credit of the drawer nor did it even correspond in
amount with that balance. It is well settled that such a check
or draft, without more, is neither a legal nor equitable assign-
ment or appropriation of a corresponding amount of the drawer's
funds in the hands of the drawee. It gives the payee no right
of action against the drawee, nor any valid claim to the funds of
the drawer in his hands. If before acceptance or payment of the
draft, the drawer executes a voluntary assignment for the benefit
of creditors, as was done in this case, the funds in the hands of
the drawee pass by the assignment as assets of the insolvent's
estate to his asignees in trust for creditors."'" As the money
on deposit passes to the depositor's voluntary assignee in trust,
under an assignment, made after the assignor's issue of a check,
but before the presentment of the check to the bank, so, it will
pass, on the supersedure of this assignee by a proceeding in
bankruptcy, to the bankrupt assignee."
CHECK THE*INSTRUMENT OF AN ASSIGNMENT.
The check may be the means of making an assignment
of the fund in bank. M as master, appointed to make sale of
land, had deposited the proceeds of the sale in bank.
He had paid the shares of all but X, to whom the balance, $634.14.
equitably belonged. In order to transfer this money to X, M
drew a check payable to him for it. The court' found that this
was an assignment of the fund."
20Jordan's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 37; Eby's Assigned Estate, 5 Lanc. 389.
21 First Nat. Bank of Mt. Joy v. Gish, 72 Pa. 13. In Fulweiler v.
Hughes, 17 Pa. 440, A drew a check in favor of B. A creditor of B, ob-
taining a judgment, issued an attachment and attached the debt in the
hands of A. The bank then refused to pay the check, to an endorsee.
"2Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545. X however was already the equi-
table owner of the fund.-Cf. Assigned Estate of Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 8
W. N. C. 436, 14 Phila. 149, where as against the drawer of the check
who subsequently withdrew his funds from the bank before the check
was paid, and after it had been retained some time by the bank, the payee
of the check was held entitled to the money.
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CHECK PAYABLE TO DEPOSITARY BANK ITSELF.
The depositor may draw a check upon his bank, which indi-
cates on its face, his intention that the money called for by it,
shall be applied in discharge of a debt due by the drawer to the
bank. Such a check is an appropriation of the amount of the
deposit equal to the amount of the check, from the time of
its presentment to the bank. The bank cannot refuse to accept
it as payment."3
FACTS NOT EPUIVALENT TO APPROPRIATION.
So long as the depositor has the right to require the bank to
pay upon his direction or order, the deposit cannot be considered
as having been assigned. Even if, after drawing a check, pay-
able to X, the drawer informs the bank that he intends that it be
paid out of the deposit or directs the bank so to apply the money,
until the money is actually applied to the check, the direction
is revocable."' The mere fact that the check is for the exact sum
on deposit, at the time it is drawn, is sometimes assumed insuffi-
cent to prove an intention to assign. A having reduced his
deposit to $260 drew a check for $260. It was not deemed an
assignment.n But the equality of the sum on deposit with the
amount of the check may, in conjunction with other 'circum-
stances, indicate the intention to assign. In Ruffle's Appeal" A
having on deposit $650, and, being about to die, expressed the
desire to give the money to his step-mother. A check for that
amount was drawn by a friend and subscribed with A's mark.
Payment of the check was declined by the bank, because there
was no subscribing witness. After A's death, the step-mother
was allowed to recover the amount from the estate, the bank
having paid it to the administratrix; that is, it was held that there
had been an executed gift.
BANK NOT LIABLE TO HOLDER.
The fact that A, having a deposit in bank, .draws a check
upon it, payable to B, which he delivers to B, does not entitle B
to sue the bank for the amount or for any amount, if the bank
disregards the order contained in the check. He must look
3Laubach v. Leibert 87 Pa. 55.2'Roberts v. Boyle, 8 York 13.25First Nat. Bank of Mt. Joy v. Gish, 72 Pa. 13; Cf. Maginn v. Dol-
lar Savings Bank, 131 Pa. 362.
26154 Pa. 183.
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solely to the drawer." This is so though the deposit in the
bank is ample.' Indirect liability by set-off perhaps does not
exist. In Mountain City Banking Co. v. Moyer' the bank hav-
ing become insolvent and passed into the hands of a receiver, held
a note drawn by X, and endorsed by Y. After the assignment X
obtained the check of a depositor in the bank, for amount greater
than the note drawn on the depoz-itory bank. The check was
refused. To obtain the check X had given to the depositor his
promissory note for like amount. X failing to secure the accept-
ing of the check as payment by the assignee, returned the check
to the drawer, and received back his note. Hence, at the trial,
of the action on the note against Y, neither X nor Y, could make
a good tender of the check, nor offer it as set-off. It is neces-
sary that the defendant should own the claim, at the trial, which
he wishes to set-off. Again, even if the check had been in pos-
session of X or Y, at the trial, as the purchase of the check was
conditional upon its usableness in set-off, it was not so absolutely
the property of the defendant that he could use it as set-off.
Again, since the deposit on which the check was drawn has since
been paid in full, by the receiver of the bank, to allow its use as
set-off would be requiring the bank to pay it twice.
MISTAKEN PAYM NT
If a check is drawn on a bank by one who has no funds in
it, and the bank receives such check from the payee, on deposit,
as cash, crediting the payee with that amount in his bank book,
the bank not then cognizant of the fact that the drawer has'no
funds, the bank may, on becoming aware of that fact, the next
day charge back the amount of the checks. It is a fraud, says
Strong, J., to draw a check on a bank in which the drawer has
no funds. "It amounts to a false affirmation that the money is
there to meet it. Hence it is a deceit practiced upon any person
to whom the check ma3 be negotiated, and eqnatly upon the
bank upon which it may be drawn. It is manifestly impossible
for the officers of a bank to keep ever in memory the state of
each depositor's account. To a certain extent, confidence is re-
posed in the depositor that he will not present for payment a
"German Nat: Bank v. Farmers Nat. Bank, 118 Pa. 294.
2First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94; Harrisburg Nat. Bank's
Appeal, 10 W. N. 41; Saylor v. Bushong, 100 Pa. 23; Northumberland
Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460.
'8 Kulp, 307.
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check which he has not provided funds to meet, and the abuse
of that confidence is dishonest. It is not easy to see how it is
less dishonest in the holder of a check dra,;rn by another, to pre-
sent it for payment, when he knows the drawer has no funds in
bank to meet it. His knowledge makes him a party to the fraud
of the drawer, and he becomes a willing assistant therein." 0
BANK BECOMES L ABLE TO HOLDER.
The 137th section of the Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 212,
concerning negotiable instruments enacts that "where a drawee
to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance, destroys the sam 4 or
refuses within 24 hours after such delivery, or within such other
period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or
nonaccepted, to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted
the same." "Refuse" is not to be understood literally. Mere
omission to return is a refusal. Bill, in this paragraph, includes
check. Hence, if a check drawn on the X bank is sent to it,
and it does. not return it to the holder, or his agent, until more
than 24 hours. e. g., until more than 2 days have elapsed, the
bank will be liable to the holder for the amount of the check, as
it would be, had it accepted the check; even though it may have
intended not to pay the check, because of the want of funds of
the drawer, and though, on the day of receiving the check, it
handed it to a notary public for the purpose of protest."1
" 0Peterson v. Union Nat. Bank, 52 Pa. 206. The knowledge of the
payee of the check was treated as important. But, surely under the
circumstances of the case, the bank would have had the same right to
charge back the check, even had the payee had no knowledge of the
absence of funds. The check was for $9003. There may havebeen a de-
posit of $657.37 to the credit of the di awer.
"'Wisner v. First Nat. Bank, 220 Pa. 21. The notary held the checks
several days, without protesting them or giving notice of dishonor, when
the agent of the payee of the check obtained it from him. Cf. also,
Banking Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Super. 17. It, Northumberland Bank
v. McMichael 106 Pa. 460, a check dated March 5th, upon the bank was
received by it on March 6th, with a letter saying "Do not hold collec-
tions. Return promptly if not paid." The balance in favor of the drawer
was then ample. On March 9th the bank received an order from the
drawer of the check not to pay it. In a suit by the payee against the
bank, whether the bank had not accepted the check prior to the counter-
mand was referred to the jury, which found that it had accepted. The
payee was therefore entitled to the money. The delay of the bank in
actually paying, was accounted for, consistently with its having accepted,
by the way it usually paid such checks, and by the fact that it was at the
time, short of funds.
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IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE.
The 123d section of the act of May 16th, 1901, states that
the,' 'acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee"
and the 137th section provides that certain other acts shall be
deemed equivalent to an acceptance. What the effect of this leg-
islation upon the existence of other modes of acceptance is, does
not yet appear by adjudications. A mode of acceptance, previ-
ously recognized was the following: If the drawee bank recog-
nized the check, by deducting it from the account of the drawer,
who acquiesced therein, it accepted the check. In Saylor v.
Bushong' the drawer of a check payment of which had been
declined by the bank, because it had suspended payment, settled
with the bank, taking a note from it, for his balane. This bal-
ance was less by the amount of the check, than it otherwise
would have been. From these facts a jury might properly have
found an agreement by the bank to keep the money and pay the
check to its holder. Says Trunkey, J., "Saylor (the holder) was
holding the check and the defendants (the bank) knew it. In
settlement of the drawer, at his request, they kept of his money
the amount of the check for the purpose of its payment * *
It matters not that the amount of the check was not formally
charged against Yeich (the drawer) and credited to Saylor. If
a bank pays a check on a forged endorsement, and deducts the
check from the drawer's account and settles with him on that
basis, it accepts the check, and must pay the money called for by
it to the payee." The correctness of this decision is however
denied in Clark v. Savings Bank' on the authority of decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Though authority in
Pennsylvania, until reversed, the court finds that since the act
of May 10th 1881 has required acceptances to be in writing, con-
structive acceptances are no longer possible. The act of 1901
also requires acceptances to be in writing.
CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE.
There may be a conditional acceptance. Banks may agree
that checks drawn on each other shall be paid, but that they may
be returned by a certain hour, if it is discovered that there were
32 00 Pa. 23.
33 Seventh Nat Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483. Charging checks to the
drawer, said Rockfeller, P. J., in Northumberland Bank v. Me. Michael,
106 Pa. 460, is evidence of acceptance.
3'31 Super. 647. Cf. Tibby Bros Co. v. F. & M. Bank, 220 Pa. 1.
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no funds to meet them, or if payment has been stopped, etc. Under
such a rule the placing of a check on file by the bank on which"
it is drawn and even entering it on the journal is not a final and
conclusive payment. It becomes so, if the check is not returned
by the specified hour.' The bank, when a check is presented,
may decline then to pay, but promise that, if the check is left
with it, and later deposits sufficient should be made by the
drawer, it will pay the check. A course of delay of this sort
might be shown between the plaintiff and the bank."
ORAL ACcrEPTANCR.
The act of May 10th, 1881, P. L. 17, forbade that any per-
son should be charged as an acceptor of any bill of exchange,
draft or order for money exceeding $20, "unless his acceptance
shall be in writing signed by himself, or his lawful agents." Sued
by the bank, the defendant undertook to set-off a check drawn
on the bank by another, and held by defendant, on the ground
that the bank had accepted it. The fact that the president of
the bank orally promised to see it paid, if the holder would retain
it for a few days, being an oral acceptance, imposed no duty on
the bank." In Maginn v. Dollar Savings Bank' McCartney had
a deposit in the Savings Bank of $631. Being indebted, in a
greater amount to Maginn he drew a check for $631 upon the
bank. This check the bank refused to pay, on the ground that
McCartney notified it not to pay. The plaintiff alleged (1) that
the bank had accepted the check and (2) that the check worked
an assignment and its acceptance was therefore unnecessary. The
acceptance, if real, was oral, and therefore invalid. If the trans-
action was an assignment, says the court, (a) the suit should
have been in the name of the assignor but (b) the more serious
objection is the act of 1881, oblivious of the fact that if the
transaction was an assignment, acceptance was unnecessary and
the act of 1881 inapplicable. The 132d section of the act of May
16th, 1901, entitled "An act relating to negotiable instruments,"
enacts that "The acceptance [of a bill or check] must be in writ-
ing and signed by the drawee." This acceptance maybe required
35 German Nat. Bank v. Farmers Nat. Bank, 118 Pa. 294.
36Johnston v. Parker Savings Bank, 101 Pa. 597. The check was
put in the bank in 1876, prior to the act of 1881 requiring written accep-
tances.
31 National State Bank of Camden v. Lindeman, 161 Pa. 199.
38131 Pa. 362.
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by the holder to be put on the check or bill. If, however, it is
written on a different paper from the check or bill, and is assented
to by the holder, it binds the acceptor only in favor of the person
who subsequently and in reliatice upon it receives the check or
bill.
PROMISE TO ACCEPT.
The 135 section of the act of May 16, 1901, declares that
"An unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill, before it is
drawn, is deemed an actual acceptance in favor of every person
who, upon the faith thereof, receives the bill for value." A tel-
egraphic agreement to accept, is considered a promise in writing.
A presents a check drawn by J. K. Lehman on the X bank, to the
Y bank for $900. Before paying it, the Y bank telegraphed to
the X bank "Will you pay check, J. K. Lehman $900." The
cashier of the X bank replied by telegram "Will pay J. K. Leh-
man check $900." The Y bank then paid the check, and for-
warded it for collection through the Z bank of Philadelphia.
Meantime Lehman had notified the X bank not to pay the check,
and it accordingly refused to pay it notwithstanding its telegram.
The Y bank could nevertheless compel the X bank to pay the
check.'
LIABILITY NOT ASSUMED.
A presents to the drawee bank a check. The drawer had
not in the bank sufficient funds to pay it. Instead of protesting
it on the day of its receipt, the bank tried to induce the drawer
to deposit enough to meet the check. Failing in that the check
was protested the following morning, and the bank that was no-
tified forwarded it for payment, by telegraph, the following morn-
ing. The drawee bank was bound neither to induce the drawer to
increase his deposit nor to notify its correspondent by telegraph
of the dishonor. As no injury arose to the holder of the check
(the payee) from failure to protest the check until the day after
its presentment, that failure imposed no liability for the check
upon the drawee."
9BFarmer's Bank v. Elizabethtown Bank, 30 Super. 271.
4Whitman v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Super. 125. If, when thecheckis
presented, it is by an employe who has no authority to do so, charged to
the account of the drawer, the act may be corrected later, by the cashier,
as soon as he discovers it, by crediting the drawer's account with the
amount of the check.
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CERTIFICATION OF CHECKS.
The bank upon which a check is drawn may certify it.
"Where a check" says the 187th section of the act relating to
negotiable instruments4 ' "is certified by the bank on which it is
drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance." No
particular form is necessary to the certification. It may be
effected by the bank officer writing the word "good" followed by
his name, upon the face of the check"2 or by writing the words
"good when properly endorsed," followed by the name of the
officer.'
OFFICER WHO CERTIFIES.
The cashier has probably the power to certify checks when
there are funds in the bank at the time to meet them, by virtue
of his office."' An employe of the bank who is called Assistant
Teller, may have the authority to certify. 5 That such Assistant
Teller has the bank's authority to certify may be shown by the ex-
plicit conferring of the authority, or that he was in the practice of
certifying with the knowledge and tacit consent of the bank [In
this case an unincorporated company]. Apparently, the cashier
may effectively authorize him, either to certify generally, or to
certify some particular checks." It may be shown by an officer
of another bank, that from 1869 to 1873 he saw quite a number
of checks which, certified by this person as assistant teller, had
been duly honored by his bank.' It may be likewise shown that
the holder of the check, after its certification, when he presented
it for payment, exhibited it not only to the officers of the bank,
but also to some of the directors who were present, and that
they, not objecting to the certification, simply said it was then
inconvenient for them to pay it. The president may, if he has
authority of the bank, certify checks."
BANK NOT IN'FUNDS.
If the officer who certifies, has authority to certify when
41P. L. 1901; p. 194, 219.
4
2 Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92; Hill v. Trust
Co. 108 Pa. 1.
4Ackerman v. Doran, 2 Leg. Ree. 345; Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa.
299.
"Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299.
4Hill v. Trust Co., 108 Pa. 1.
46108 Pa. 1.
47108 Pa. 1; Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299.
8Ackerman v. Dorran, 2 Leg. Rec. 345.
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there are funds of the drawer in the bank, his certification will
bind the bank, towards a bona 1fde holder, for value of the check
after such certification. "If his authority" says Sterrett, J., "as
between himself and principals, was in fact restricted to cases in
which the drawer had sufficient funds and he either intentionally
or by mistake, transcended that authority, by marking the check
"good" when the drawer thereof had no funds, the consequences
of his infidelity or blunder should be visited not upon the inno-
cent holders of the checks so certified, but upon the agent's em-
ployers who put it in his power to commit the wrong."' 9
CHECK NOT DRAWN IN USUAL COURSE O BUSIN-SS.
When the check is drawn, not to secure the early and uncon-
ditional payment by the bank of the money called for by it, but to
be held as collateral security for the doing of some act, and to secure
the payment of money to the holder only on the contingent failure
of performance of this act, the cashier has no authority to cer-
tify it, and if the object of the check appears on its face, the want
of authority can be set up by the bank against any subsequent
purchaser of the check. A check required the Citizens' Savings
Bank to pay to D or order $2,000. Then followed the words
"To hold as collateral for 1,000 P. T. oil, pipage paid to January
4, 1876." There were no funds in the bank at the time with
which to meet the check. Says Paxson, J., "It is also apparent
that the check was entirely out of the usual course of banking-
business * * Instead of being a mere order upon a bank to
pay a certain sum of money to a person therein designated or to
bearer it has the significant endorsement in one corner, "to hold
as collateral," etc.. This indicates plainly that the check was
given merely as collateral security for the delivery of the oil."
There was also evidence that the check was given as security for
the return of borrowed oil. If the oil was not returned, the check
was to be paid. "If" says Paxson J., "the certificate of Foster
[the cashier] that the check was "good when properly endorsed,"
is to bind the bank, then the cashier has made the bank secu-
rity for the delivery of 2,000 barrels of oil. This he could not
do without authority. * * There is not a word in'the evi-
dence to show that the defendants [a banking firm] or any of
19108 .Pa. 1.
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them knew of this transaction, much less sanctioned it." The
holder of such a check, knowing that he could withdraw the
money, only after default in the delivery of the oil, could not
enforce it against the bank, even after such default.
WHO MAY CAUSE THE CERTIFICATION.
The application to the bank to certify the check, may be
made by the drawer, in order to increase the readiness of the
payee to receive it, or by the payee or later holder, after it has
been received from the drawer, "Where" says section 188 of the
act relating to negotiable instruments5' "the holder of a check
procures it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all indorsers
are discharged from liability thereon." 'The certification of a
check is often to be regarded as a payment by which the drawer
is discharged. "This is so where the certification is procured by
the holder after the check has been delivered. On the other
hand, the drawer will not be discharged by certificate procured
by himself.'5 "
EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION ON THE BANK.
When the bank, at whosesoever instance, certifies a check it
becomes unconditionally bound to pay it. Even if the depositor
has no funds at the time, or afterwards, in the bank, it must pay
the check to a bonafide purchaser.' If he has funds the sum
mentioned in the check ceases to stand to his credit. It forth-
with passes to the credit of the holder of the check." The
bank, therefore, which is not ordinarily suable on a check by the
holder, may be sued by him upon it, if it has been certified."
But, after certification, as before, the bank is not suable until a
demand for payment has been made upon it, and the statute of
5Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299, An unsuccessful attempt was made
to show the recognition by the bank of the cashier's certifications in
prior similar cases. The cases proved were of certifications of "straight
checks" that is, checks for the payment of money free from clog or
condition.
5" P. L. 1901, p. 195; 219.
527 Cyc. 644. The endorsee of the check procured the certification
in Hill v. Trust Co., 108 Pa. 1.
5" Hill v. Trust Co. 108 Pa. 1.
54Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92; Trust Etc. Co.
v. White, 206 Pa, 613.
589 Pa. 92; 108 Pa. 1; 85 Pa. 299.
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limitations begins to run only from such demand.' Apparently
the certifying bank is not liable even to a bonafide purchaser of
the check, for value if, prior to the certification, the check has
been "raised," and it was not negligent in certifying."
WHEN CERTIFICATION INEFFECTUAL.
The check may have been procured by fraud or undue influ-
ence from the drawer. He may have been, when he drew it,
non comfios mentos. Under such facts, the bank, although it
has certified the check, may be compelled not to pay the money
to the holder, if he is not one, against whom, in a suit upon the
check itself, the di awer could not successfully set up such a defense.
In Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. White,58 White drew a check upon
the Lancaster Trust Company for $1,500, in favor of a son. This
check was certified by the Trust Co. Shortly after White's death
the son presented the certified check to the X company and re-
ceived a cashier's check for it. Meantime, other sons of White
notified the Lancaster Trust Co., not to pay the check, and that
company accordingly refused to pay it when it was presented.
Subsequently the X company sued the Lancaster Trust Com-
pany to recover the amount of the check. That company paid
the amount into court, and an issue was formed between the X
company and the administrators of White, to test the validity of
the check, on the ground of alleged mental incapacity of White.
The court finding no adequate evidence of White's insanity, prop-
erly gave binding instruction for the X company. It was entitled
to the money as holder of the certified check, having given its
cashier's check for it.
SUIT AGAINST DRAWER OF CERTIFIED CHECK.
It is said by Walker, J., that the extent to which the drawer
of a check is liable upon it after he has had it marked good, de-
pends upon the agreement and understanding of the parttes. The
holder continues bound to present the check within due time, to
the bank, and if he does not, and the bank suspends payment,
5639 Pa. 92. Payment of the money to the original depositor, two
years after the certification, is no excuse for not paying it, five years
later to the holder. Thus paying the deposit and taking from the depos-
itor a bond of indemnity, would rebut the presumption of payment of the
check, if there were any.
57136 Pa. 426.
5206 Pa. 611.
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the drawer of the check will be discharged. Whether more than
a due time elapsed, when eight days elapsed, since the issue of
the certified check before the holder presented it for payment,
the bank having meanwhile suspended, the jury, not the court,
must determine."
ENDORSEMENT OF CHECK.
A check, like other negotiable paper; may be endorsed by
the payee, and thus negotiated.' The fact of an endorsement
on the check prior to the payee's name, is immaterial. It can-
not prevent his recovery:"' A check, payable to a partnership
may, in its name, be endorsed by bne of them." An endorse-
ment of one who is insolvent, to a relative without consideration,
will be invalid, as against the creditors of the endorser, who may
attach the money, as still his property. But, if this gratuitous
endorsee in turn, endorses to another who pays value, and has
no notice of the fraud, the last endorsee will be entitled to the
money.' The endorsee for a good consideration having no notice
of fraudulent representations by which the drawer was induced
to draw the check to the payee had a right to obtain the money on
the check, and obtaining it, to retain it as against the drawer.6
VIRTUAL TRANSFER OF CHECK.
A sells corn to B intending the sale to be for cash, and re-
ceives B's check. B fails later in the day, before presentment
of the check for payment. Meantime, B has sold the.corn to C.
receiving C's check. B deposits this check in his bank which
has heretofore honored his checks in excess of his deposits, under
what was virtually an agreement so to do. This makes the bank
the account in which of B had been overdrawn a holder for val-
ues of the check. A will not be entitled to a decree in equity
that the bank transfer this check to A, on the theory that the
sale of the corn could be rescinded by A, and that therefore,
-when C. received the corn, the check given by him, became A's.Y
59Ackermann v. Dorman, 2 Leg. Ree. 345. The bank suspended pay-
ment on the seventh day following that on which the check was issued.
The check was not presented until the next day. On the day after the
check had been certified, the account of the drawer had been charged
with its amount. At the time of the giving of the check and up to the
time of the suspension, the drawer had had on deposit very much more
tharn the amount called for in the check.
6 Walker v. Geisse, 4 Wh. 252.
"'Woodward v. Clung; 1 Phila. 176. The payee's possession of the
check, after he had endorsed it to others, is evidence that he has takenit, up.
6 Fulweiler v. Hughes, 17 Pa. 440.
617 Pa. 440. Notice of the prior gift is not notice of the fraud.
There must be notice of the insolvency.
64 Stedman v. Carstairs, 97 Pa. 234.
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MOOT COURT
GEORGE HAYNES V. KATE BAKER.
Set-Off-Appeal fromjustice of the Peace-Motion for Non-Suit
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In November, 1888, George Haynes brought suit against Kate Baker
in assumpsit for $60, alleged to be due him for team work. At the trial
before the justice, Baker showed set-off to the amount of $200, and judg-
anent was rendered in favor of the defendant for $140. An appeal was
taken by the plaintiff and the transcript filed as of No. 5, February term,
1889. Nothing was done until July, 1909, when the case was set down
for trial by the defendant. Motion on the part of the plaintiff, Haynes,
for leave to take a voluntary non-suit. Rule to show cause.
STRAUSS for Plaintiff.
BARNITZ for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARRETT, J.-To confer jurisdiction on the Common Pleas Court in
a case appealed from the court of a justice of the peace, it must be
shown that the latter had jurisdiction of the cause. The justice of the
peace in this case had jurisdiction conferred on him by the Act of Assem-
bly of July 7, 1879, Section 1, P. L. 194, which reads: "The aldermen,
magistrates and justices of the peace in this commonwealth shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of Common Pleas -f all actions
arising from contract, either expressed or implied, and, of all actions of
trespass and of- trover and conversion wherein the sumS'demanded does
not exceed three hundred dollars, except in cases of real contracts where
the title to lands or tenements may come in question, or action upon
promise of marriage."
We shall now proceed to consider the effect of a voluntary non-suit
and summon to our aid the case of Township of Moreland v. Gardner,
109 Pa. 118, which contains the following discussion: "Practically the
cause was as effectively terminated by the plaintiff therein suffering a
non-suit. It ended the case. The effect is not the same as if the party
appealing had withdrawn his appeal. If this had been the case, the effect
would have been to reinstate the judgment." In this connection we shall
also consider the case of McKennan v. Henderson, 5 W. & S. 370, in
which the court held that "if a cause be referred to arbitration and an
award made in favor of the defendant for a certain sum and the plaintiff
appeals, and afterward, by leave of the court, suffers a non-suit, the
award is thereby defeated. The non-suit has the same operation as at
common law, and, at common law, it cannot be pretended bit that the
proceedings must be.de nevo." The latter case is affirmed in 95 Pa. 203.
No authority has been found in this state to support the proposition
that a non-suit can he granted where judgment is given, after a sat-off
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has been pleaded. It is true, however, that the court in McCredy v.
Frey, 7 Watts 496, in which case a set-off was pleaded, granted a volun-
tary non-suit, but the non-suit was allowed before judgment was given,
and after the evidence had all been heard on both sides. There, the court
was particular to emphasize that the plaintiff may suffer a non-suit at any
time during the trial of the cause and before the jury are ready to give
their verdict, notwithstanding that there be an issue upon the plea of
set-off. And the court will refuse a non-suit where the application is
made after the jury have agreed upon and sealed their verdict, but before
they have formally announced their verdict in court.-5 Pa. C. C. 151.
The court in the latter case distinguishes 8 Watts 308, 7 Watts 496,
and 9 W. & S. 153, declaring that, in the cases distinguished, the ques-
tion turned on, when are the jury ready to give their verdict ? In 5 Pa.
C. C. 151, the court construes the Act of March 28, 1814, which is as fol-
lows: "Whenever on the .trial of any cause, the jury shall be ready to
give their verdict, the plaintiff shall not be c'alled, nor shall he then be
permitted to suffer a non-suit." In discussing the act that court says:
"This act was remedial and ought to be so construed as to remedy the
wrong it was intended to remedy, that is, to prevent the plaintiff from
being non-suited after the verdict was agreed upon."
To further guard against any wrong from this source, the Legislature
passed the Act of April 16, 1903, Section 1, P. L. 216, which is now upon
our statute books. The act is as follows: "Hereafter, upon the trial of
any cause in any court of common pleas of the Commonwealth, the plain-
tiff shall not be permitted to suffer a voluntary non-suit after the jury
have agreed upon their verdict, sealed the same and separated, unless
such non-suit shall be especially allowed for cause shown." Applicable
to the case at bar in the following doctrine, which we find in 1 Rawle
841: "Non-suit will not be allowed when by so doing the plaintiff will
obtain an advantage and the defendant will be prejudiced or oppressed."
We decide the case before us upon the latter authority.
Rule discharged.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
In Lewis v. Culbertson, 11 S. & R. 60, Duncan, J., said: "As I
understand the law on this subject, it is that the plea of set-off is in its
nature an action and that the plaintiff cannot discontinue." The great
weight of authority outside of Pennsylvania is to the same effect.-14
Cyc. 407. In Pennsylvania, however, the contrary doctrine is held to be
the law. In McCredy v. Fey, 7 Watts 496, the remark of Duncan was
held to be mere dictum and it was held that the plaintiff may suffer a
non-suit at any time before the jury are ready to give their verdict, not-
withstanding the fact that there is an issue upon a plea of set-off. The
plaintiff is entitled to suffer a non-suit after the defendant has pleaded
a set-off. even though issue has been joined on the plea and evidence has
been given in support thereof.-Gilmore v. Reed, 76 Pa. 462, MeCredy v.
Fey, 7 Watts, 496. The fact that the set-off exceeds the plaintiff's
claim does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to suffer a non-suit.-
Shannon v. ,Truefet, 1 W. N. C. 248.
It has also been held that when the plaintiff has recovered a judg-
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ment before a justice and the defendant has appealed, ipi the tffmlnaay
suffer a non-suit in the common pleas, and that the effect of the non-suit
is not only to put the case out of the common pleas but to leave no judg-
ment before the justice. "Practically the cause was effectively termi-
nated by the plaintiff therein suffering a non-suit. It ended the case.
The effect was not the same as if the party appealing had withdrawn his
appeal. If this had been the case the effect would have been to reinstate
the judgment. In this case the defendant in the judgment appealed
therefrom. During the pendency of that appeal the judgment was super-
seded. The case was an action pending. Thereupon, the plaintiff, by
suffering a non-suit, not only put the case out of the common pleas, but
left no judgment before the justice."-Moreland v. Gardner, 109 Pa. 116.
No case, however, has been found holding that where the defendant
has recovered judgment before a justice on a plea of set-off and the
plaintiff has appealed therefrom, the plaintiff may suffer a non-suit and
thereby "have no judgment before the justice."
It is true that it has been held that if a cause has been referred to
arbitrators under the compulsory arbitration law and an appeal taken by
the plaintiff, and afterwards, by leave of court, the plaintiff has suffered
a non-suit, the award is thereby defeated.-M'Kennan v. Henderson, 5
W. & S. 370; Dubois v. Bigler, 25 Pa. 203. These decisions, however,
were the result of a section of the statute regulating compulsory arbitra-
tion, which provided that "the court may, after appeal, allow the plain-
tiff to suffer a non-suit, with like effect as if the case had not been re-
ferred as aforesaid," etc. -Section 25, Act of 1836, P. L. 722. Prior to
the enactment of this statute, it was held that if a plaintiff, after having
entered an appeal from an award of arbitrators, suffer a voluntary non-
suit, the award became an absolute judgment.-King v. Sloan, 1 S. & R.
77; Hostetter v. Kaufman, 11 S. & R. 148. The decision in these cases
to the effect that the award became absolute was based upon the 10th
section of the Act of March 20, 1810, which provided that "the award of
arbitrators shall have the effect of a judgment until reversed on appeal."
The statute providing for appeals to the common pleas from the jus-
tice of the peace does not so provide. The appeal acts as a supersedeas
and the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace is not regarded
as in being, or having any virtue attached to itwhatever afterthe appeal
shall be duly taken out and entered.-Hastings v. Lalough, 7 Watts 540.
It seems, however, that the mere taking of an appeal does not annul the
judgment before the justice under all circumstances. For it is held that
whenever there is a judgment before the justice on the merits, against
the plaintiff, from which he appeals to the common pleas and discontin-
ues, that judgment is a bar to any other suit for the same cause of action.
-Rose v. Turnpike Co., 3 Watts 46; Teton v. Weyman, 10 Pa. 70. See,
also, Mooreland v. Gardner, supra. The difference in the legal effect of
a non-suit and a discontinuance is slight.-Evans v. Clover, 1 Grant 164.
But whether the effect of permitting a non-suit in this case would
be to make the judgment in favor of the defendant absolute or to annul
the whole proceeding and place the parties in the same position as they
were before the action was started, the opinion of the lower court must
be affirmed-
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If permitting the non-suit would havelendered the judgment for the
defendant absolute, surely the plaintiff has no reason to complain because
it was not permitted.
On the other hand, if the effect of permitting the non-suit would
have been to annul the whole proceeding, the learned court was right in
refusing to permit the non-suit. A non-suit will not be permitted if the
plaintiff will thereby gain an advantage and the defendant will be preju-
diced or oppressed, or deprived of any just defense.-14 Cyc. 406; Bank
v. Fisher, I Rawle 341; Payne v. Grant, 7 W. N. C. 406.
The present case is one in which this rule should be applied. The
case was tried before a justice and the defendant obtained a judgment.
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed, and after the case was set for
trial he moved for leave to take a voluntary non-suit. Under the hypothe-
sis that the effect of a lowing this non-suit would be to annul the whole
proceeding, its consequence would be that the defendant would lose the
benefit of his judgment which maybe his only security for money justly
due, and, further, when he commenced a suit against the plaintiff he
would probably be met by a plea of the act of limitations.
There is not the slightest necessity for allowing the non-suit. The
only reason that can be alleged is that the plaintiff might be forced to
trial in the absence of his witnesses or without other means of proof. It
is a curious remedy by which the injury, if there is one, is shifted from
the one and thrown upon the shoulders of the other. To relieve the
plaintiff from a difficulty caused very probably by his own negligence, it
would be necessary to do a positive wrong to the defendant. Moreover,
the court has ample power to protect the plaintiff by allowing a continu-
ance.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH V. COAL.
Receiving Stolen Goods-Act of April 23 1909, P. L. 159.
Liability of Ultimate of Several Vendees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hadley took and carried away the goods of Johnson under such cir-
cumstances as to constitute larceny. Beyer bought the goods from Had-
ley, knowing that they had been stolen. Coal bought the goods from
Beyer knowing that they had been stolen.
MENDELSOHN for Commonwealth.
CHALLIS for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRANYAN, J.-The question in this case treats not of a mere re-
ceiver of stolen goods, but is whether or not a person who receives the
goods, knowing them to have been stolen, from a previous receiver, is
guilty of receiving stolen goods. This question depends upon whether
or not this second receiver comes within the statute of 1909, P. L. 159,
which reads as follows: "That if any person shall buy, have or receive,
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within the limits of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, any goods, chat-
tels, moneys, or securities, or any other matter or thing which shall have
been stolen or felonionsly taken, either in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, or in any other state or country, knowing the same to have
been stolen, or feloiiously taken, such person shall be guilty of a felony,
and on conviction, suffer the like pains and penalties which are by law
imposed upon the person who shall have actually stolen or feloniously
carried away the same within the limits of this commonwealth."
It is true, as counsel for defendant has said and cited, that the "re-
ceiver of stolen goods was anciently guilty of only a misprision of felony
or of a compounding of felony. But later he became an accessory after
the fact to the thief under an old English Statute. Later legislation in
England and the United States has made this offence a substantive crime.
-Bisp. Cr. Law This is also substantiated by Dr. Trickett in Trickett's
Penna. Cr. Law 37.
But in all the cases cited in Beale's Cr. Cdses 775, 777 and 778 by de-
fendant, and 36 Mo., 394, 41 Ala. 393, and 95 N. C. 626, the old English
doctrine of a first receiver is illustrated and hence is not in point with the
casd at bar.
At common law these doctrines applied: (a) receiving goods from one
who guiltily received them from the thief has been held not to be receiv-
ing stolen goods, as in the receiver's hands the goods are not stolen.
Clark's Cr. Law, P. 328, 36 Ire. 338. 2 Bisp. New Cr. Law § 1140. (b)
The receiver of stolen goods must have received them from some person
who is guilty of larceny as principal offender, State vs Ives, 13 Ire. 338,
because in the latter case, they are not, as to the person who gets them
property stolen. Cassel vs State, 4 Yerg. 149. Wright vs State 5
Yerg. 154.
Now legislation in Pennsylvania previous to this Act of 1909, is the
Act of Mar. 31, 1860, p. 382, P. & L. Dig., "If any person shall buy or
receive any goods, chattels, moneys, securities or any other matter or
thing, the stealing of which is made larceny, by any law of this common-
wealth, knowing the same to have been stolen, or feloniously taken, such
person shall be guilty of a felony, and on conviction etc."
"The only possible defense in this case would be that defendant was
so intoxicated as not to have the intent to carry out the particular crime
or that the defendant was a married woman and did the act under the
coercion of her husband "Trickett's Cr. Law, Vol. I.
This act of 1909, the court holds is simply declaratory of the act of
1860, and has been made to be a little larger in its scope than the act of
1860. But the court also holds that this statute's purpose is to fill in the
gap, which is left in the common law, by not including the second receiver.
We hold, that it would be a great injustice, should the statute not
cover the case at bar, for the law would find no little trouble tracing the
goods from one receiver to another.
The defendant is indicted under the Act of 1909, and since the ele-
ments of knowing the goods to be stolen, and the fact that they were
stolen, are present, the court declines to give the instruction asked for.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The crime defined by the Act of April 23, 1909, T. L. 159, consists of
buying having or receiving, in this State, of goods etc, which shall have
been stolen anywhere, with knowledge that they have been stolen.
The goods in the case before us were Johnson's. They were stolen
from him by Hadley. Beyer bought them from Hadley, knowing that
they had been stolen. Coal bought them from Beyer, with the same
knowledge.
The goods did not cease to have been stolen, and to be stolen goods,
when Beyer bought them; they remained such when Coal took them from
Beyer. It has been mysteriously said, in Foster v. State .106 Ind. 272,
that "If therefore the goods have been transferred from the thief to a
guilty receiver the latter takes as a receiver and not as a thief. [Who
could doubt it?] In his hands and as to him the goods are not stolen. [!!]
In his hands the character of the goods is derived from his offense, and not
from the offense of the person who stole them so that one who receives
such goods from him, however wickedly, is not guilty of receiving stolen
goods within either the common law or statutory definition of the offense,
unless such second or subsequent receiver receives the goods under cir-
cumstances which' connect him with the thief." Stolen goods are goods,
we suppose, that have been stolen, from the point of view of the owner
who has been deprived of them, and are still his, although they are still
in the possession of the thief or of some other person without any author-
ity from the owner, obtained since the theft. A doctrine similar to that
of Foster v. State, is set forth by Wharton, 1 Crim. L. p. 855; by Bishop,
2 Crim. Law, p. 643, and by 24 Am. and Eng. Encyc. p. 50.
On the other hand, Tindal C. J. in Rex v. Jervis 6 C. &P. 156 said
that it was unnecessary that the indictment should name the persons who
committed the theft, or should aver that he was unknown, because "the
offense created by the act of parliament is not receiving stolen goods
from any particular person, but receiving them knowing them to have
been stolen. The question therefore will be whether the goods are stolen,
and whether the prisoner received them knowing them to have been
stolen."
That it is not necessary that the goods should have been received
from the thief, is the doctrine of Levi v. State, 13 Neb. 1 (14 N. W. 543).
of Smith v. State, 59 Oh. St. 350; 52 N. E. 826; and of State v. Fink, 186
Mo. 50; 84 S. W. 921. Cf. also, 34 Cyc. 518.
The policy of the act of 1909 like that of its predecessor is evidently
to diminish the temptation to theft and to facilitate the recovery of the
goods by embarrassing the disposal of the stolen goods, and this poliey
would dictate the incriminating of the knowing receiving not less from a
receiver than from the thief himself. To embarrass the receiver's dis-
posal of the goods is to lessen his willingness to take them, and thus to
lessen the willingness of the thief to steal them.
The writer of the opinion in State vs. Fink, 186 Mo. 50 observes:
"An examination of the case demonstrates that finally the terms of the
statute or law in force defining the offense, must control and furnish the
solution of the proposition. Under the provisions of our statute the only
element of the offense is the receiving of stolen propertywith knowledge
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at the time of its reception, that the same was stolen. There is an entire
absence from the terms of our statute of any indication that the person
from whom the stolen property is received is to constitute an essential
element of the offence." A similar remark can be made of the act of
1909. It would have been easy for the legislature to say that any person
who should buy etc. any goods, etc. which should have been stolen, from
the thief, should be guilty of a felony. It has not used the words from
the thief or any equivalent. We should mar the act, and lessen its effi-
ciency, if, usurping the ftinctions of the legislature, we should intercalate
these words.
Judgment affirmed.
BOWMAN V. WEINER.
Trespass for False Imprisonment-Assisting Officer to Arrest.-
When Justified.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A man was found dead on the street of Carlisle and the surrounding
circumstances suggested that a murder had been committed. One Mitch-
ell, a policeman, at once suspected Bowman, a man whom for several
reasons, Mitchell was anxious to have in prison. In fact the dead man
died from natural causes and Mitchell had not reasonable grounds for
suspecting Bowman, had a crime been committed. Mitchell did not get
a warrant for Bowman's arrest but started at once for his house. Meet-
ing Weiner in front of Bowman's house he called on him to accompany
him and aid in the arrest of Bowman. Weiner demurred, asked about
the cause, warrant, etc., but Mitchell replied that there was no time for
discussion and that if he failed to help, he would do so at his peril.
Weiner then aided Mitchell in arresting Bowman and taking him to jail.
Bowman now brings this action for false imprisonment against Weiner.
EASTER for Plaintiff.
SILVERMAN for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MOYER, J.-The facts in this case expressly state that Mitchell, the
pxDliceman, had "no reasonable grounds for suspecting Bowman, had a
crime been committed." Consequently, the officer could be held in an
action for false imprisonment. In the case of a felony an officer can
only arrest without a warrant where the felony has been committed or
where he has reasonable grounds of belief that it has been recently com-
mitted and that the person whom he arrests is the offender. But even
then, if he has time, he should go to a magistrate and get a warrant.
Burk v. Howles, 179 Pa. 539. Had Weiner, the private citizen made the
arrest himself without the intervention of the policeman, he would cer-
tainly be in no better position than the officer. A constable or other of-
ficer may justify an arrest for reasonable cause of suspicion alone; and
in this respect he stands on more favorable ground than a private person,
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who must show, in addition to such cause, that a felony was actually
committed. -Riissel v. Shuster, W. & S. 308.
So the question now arises, whether Weiner is protected in this ac-
tion for false imprisonment because of the fact that he acted only upon
the order of the officer and obeyed stricty that order. "There are circum-
stances in which public officers are authorized to require private
citizens to assist them in performing official duties; and if, being
called to render this assistance, they without lawful excuse, refuse, or
having undertaken, refuse to proceed in good faith,-they must answer
for the refusal as a crime." Bishop's Criminal Law Vol. 1 sect. 920.
Comfort et al. v. Com., 5 Wharton, page 440, sets out that by the Act
of 1772 section 6, protection is afforded to any constable or officer, or any
person or persons acting by his or their order and in his aid, for anything
in obedience to any warrant under the hand and seal of any justice of the
peace; which applies generally to civil as Well as criminal cases. But this
clearly specifies protection under a warrant and there was no warrant in
the present case.
We find that in Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, it has been held that
a person who, when called upon, comes to the assistance of one whom he
knows to be an officer, if in his acts he confines himself to the orders and
directions of the officer, is protected against suits for irespass and false
imprisonment, whether the officer was acting legally or not. This doc-
trine has also been held to in one or two other cases. However, in view
of several other decisions and the discussion of the subject in the digests,
we believe that this doctrine is not a correct statement of the law. In
Am. and Eng. Enc. Vol. 12 page 770, it is stated that "the true rule is be-
lieved to be that a person assisting an officer at his request, simply stand
upon the same ground as the officer himself and is subject to the same
liability." And in Volume 19 Ency. page 350, d: "a person who assists an
officer in the performance of his legal duty, although without process, is
justified at least, whenever the officer would be justified. But if the jus-
tification of the arrest itself fails, the officer and those who aid, or abet
him may also be liable. Justification exists only in respect of a known
peace officer, authorized to arrest."
Persons assisting an officer at his request, in making an arrest, are
liable in false imprisonment, if the warrant attempted to be executed is
a void warrant.-Nidoy v. Stephens 3 Blackf, (Ind.) 48. In Vinton v.
Weaver, 41 Me. 430, the court said: "It is insisted that a distinction ex-
ists between the aids and servants of the officer and the officer himself,
and that, while it is conceded that the latter may be liable, the former
should be exempt from liability. But such seems not to be regarded as
the law. They must both stand or fall together" and again in the case of
Oystead v. Shed, 12 Mass. 506, it was held that a distinction is made be-
tween cases where the act of the officer was originally unlawful and those
where he is subsequently guilty of conduct which renders him a trespasser
ab initio. In the first instance private persons aiding or assisting an offi-
cer are liable as joint trespassers with the officer, but in the latter they
are exempt.
There are no particular circumstances stated in the case at bar to
take it out of the above stated rule. The arrest by Mitchell was an un-
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lawful one. He had no warrant and there were no reasonable grounds
for suspecting Bowman. Weiner asked the policeman about the cause,
warrant, etc., and was refused information. This shouldhaveputhim on
his guard. Weiner was bound to know Mitchell's authority. The act of
Mitchell being unlawful, Weiner was a joint trespasser. The situation
was an unfortunate one for Weiner, but he might have redress against
Mitchell. Judgment is entered accordingly for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It is not necessary, in all cases that an arrest for an infraction of the
criminal law should be under the authority and by command of a warrant.
A private citizen, as well as an officer of the law, may under certain con-
ditions arrest without a warrant even in cases of felony. The rights of
a private citizen and an officer to arrest without a warrant in cases of
-felony are not however, the same. This distinction is this: An officer
may arrest without a warrant upon probable cause though no felony has
been actually committed; but a private citizen may arrestwithout a war-
rant only when (1) the felony charged has actually been committed, and
(2) there is probable cause for supposing the party arrested to be guilty.
-Russell v. Shuster 8 W. & S. 308; Wakely v. Hart 6 Binn, 317; Brooks
v. Corn 61 Pa. 352.
The arrest by Mitchell was unlawful because not based upon "proba-
ble cause" and an arrest by Weiner, acting independently of the policeman,
would have been unlawful because no felony had actually been committed.
The sole question, therefore is as to the effect of Mitchell's command
to Weiner to aid him in making the arrest. There is a decided conflict of
authority upon the question whether one who, in response to a call for
his services by a police officer, assists the latter in making an arrest,
may justify where the arrest itself is illegal, and the officer himself can-
not justify.
The majority of the cases hold that one called upon to assist an-offi-
cer must decide at his peril whether or not the officer is justified in mak-
ing the arrest and cannot justify unless the officer can justify. Mitchell v.
State, 12 Ark. 50; Pow v. Beckner, 3 Md. 475; Batchelder v. Currier, 45
N. H. 460; Vinton v. Weaver, 41 Me. 430, Barnette v. Hicks, 6 Tex. 852;
Oystead v. Shed, 12 Mass. 506; Elder v. Morrison, 10 Wend. 128.
The tort of false imprisonment is regarded as a breach of an absolute
duty, and the holding of these cases is in conformity to the general
principle that the command of another is no defence to an action for tort
The decision of the learned court below is amplyj justified by the. au-
thorities cited.
Judgment affirmed.
TAYLOR V. RICE
Bulk Act of March 28, 1905-Fraudulent Sale-Notice to
Vendee
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rice, a wholesale dealer, sold a quantity of groceries to Berger, on
thirty days credit. Ten days after he received the goods Berger sold his
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entire stock and fixtures to Taylor who paid cash and took possession at
once. Taylor asked Berger whether he had any creditors and Berger
named one Scott whom he said he would pay at once. He did not give
Taylor Scott's name and address in writing and he did not mention his
debt to Rice. As soon as the thirty days credit expired and Berger failed
to pay, Rice brought suit against Berger and notified Taylor he would
levy on the stock Taylor had bought as soon as he got judgment. He did
not get judgment until four months after Taylor's purchase but he at
once levied on the stock of goods in Taylor's possession. Taylor brings
trespass.
COHEN for Plaintiff.
DAY for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EASTER, J-The facts set forth in the plaintiff's statement involve
and are governed by an Act of Assembly of March 28, 1905 P. L. 62, com-
monly known as the Bulk Act; that is "Relative to the sale in bulk
of the whole, or a large part of a stock bf merchandise, and fix-
tures, or merchandise, or fixtures, not in the ordinary course of business;
providing certain requirements thereof; imposing certain duties upon the
seller; and making their violation a misdemeanor."
The manifest object of this legislation is to prevent, or at least to
render more difficult and improbable the successful perpetration of the
kind of fraud named in the act and the means chosen by the legislature
have a real and substantial relation to that object.
Section 1 of the Act enacts, "That the sale in bulk of the whole, or
a large part, of a stock of merchandise and fixtures, or merchandise, or
fixtures, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular
and usual prosecution of the seller's business shall be deemed fraudulent,
and voidable as against the creditors of the seller, unless the purchaser
shall in good faith, and for the purpose of giving the notice herein re-
quired, make inquiry of the seller, and receive from him a list in writing
of the names, and places of residence or business of each and all of his
creclitors, and, unless the purchaser shall, at least five days before the
consummation of the sale, give personal notice of said proposed sale, to
each of the creditors of the seller as appearing on said list, oruse reason-
able diligence to cause personal notice to be given to him, or shall deposit
in the mail a registered letter of notice, postage prepaid, addressed to
each of the seller's said creditors at his postoffice address, according to
the written information furnished; provided, however, that no proceed-
ings at law or equity shall be brought against the purchaser to invalidate
any such voidable sale, after the expiration of ninety days from the con-
summation thereof."
It was certainly not enacte.t for the mere purpose of oppressing any
class of persons, but was designed rather to promote with as little indi-
vidual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Compliance therewith
in good faith tends not only to the protection of creditors but to the se-
curity of the purchaser in his title as well. Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 311.
Many restraints upon the freedom of contract have been sustained a$
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valid. Examples are; the statute of frauds, the act to prevent fraudu-
lent conveyances, insolvent laws, the recording act, the prohibition of us-
ury, and others. These show in how many ways and in what varied
forms the legislature may properly restrain freedom of action in com-
mercial transactions in order to promote the general welfare. While
commerce is hampered to a limited extent in some ways, it is protected
and promoted to a much greater extent in other ways.
The act has been held constitutional in Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 285; and not to be arbitrary class legislation 39 Sup. Ct. 39.
The statute deals with a particular class of sales but the rule of con-
duct prescribed for the seller in each sale within the class is precisely the
same as that prescribed for the seller in every other sale within the class,
and the same is true of the purchaser. It is true the effect of the legisla-
tion is to require the parties to such sale to do that which parties to
other sales of personalty are not required to do, and in that sense it is
class legislation with respect to persons as well as to things.
The facts disclose in the case that Taylor did not comply with the
requirements of the act. He did not in good faith and for the purpose of
giving the notice required, make inquiry of the seller, and receive from
him a list of the names and places of residence or business of each and all
of Berger's creditors, and; "unless the purchaser shall, at least five days
before the consummation of the sale, give personal notice of said proposed
sale, to each of the creditors of the seller, as appearing on the said list,
or use reasonable diligence to cause personal notice to be given them,"
the sale is void. Notwithstanding this negligence of Taylor the fraudulent
intent by Berger in making the sale renders the sale invalid and voidable.
This case is governed in this respect by Newmeyer v. Mayers, 35 0. 0.
145.
The act provides, "that no proceedings at law or equity shall be
brought against the purchaser to invalidate any such voidable sale after
the expiration of ninety days from the consummation thereof.
In the case of Newmeyer v. Mayer, supra, the original vendor se-
cured judgment against his vendee, but the vendee of the fraudulent
sale was not made party to the action nor were proceedings instituted
against him in law or equity as required by the provision. It was then
held the sale was good. The law in that case we adopt as the rule in the
present procaeding. Taylor secured an absolute title of the goods by the
delay of Rice in prosecuting.
It seems to me that the provision of the clause limiting the time in
which action is to be brought to recover the goods is hardly sufficient.
The vendor must first proceed against the vendee, the vendor of the fraudu-"
lent sale, then after securing judgment there must be an issue tried to
determine the ownership of the goods. The vendor of the fraudulent sale
should be summoned as the garnishee and thus brought into the cause
immediately.
This is an action of trespass against Rice for disturbing the posses-
sion of Taylor's goods, the title of which was made complete and abso-
lute at the expiration of ninety days unless action was brought against him
within that time.
The attorney for tha defendant contends that if any action for tres-
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pass arises that the sheriff is the proper one to be brought in as defend-
ant. Admitting that such an action might lie, that will not excuse the
defendant in this action.
All who are concerned in the act of trespass are liable as principals
and each trespasser is liable for the entire damages inflicted. 11 Barb,
(N. Y.) 91.
The gist of the action is the wrong done to the plaintiff's possessions,
and in this case such wrong has been committed. (17 Wend, N. Y.) 91.
In view of the doctrine laid down we therefore hold that the action of
trespass will lie and hereby give judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The act of March 28th 1905 contain the proviso that no proceeding
at law or in equity shall be brought against the purchaser to invalidate
the sale, after the expiration of ninety days from the consummation of it.
It is quite clear that no proceeding was begun against the purchaser
within ninety days. A suit was brought against the debtor, the vendor
of the goods within the ninety days. But, while that may be a step towards
contesting the title of the purchaser, it is not a contestation, nor a proceed-
ing to invalidate the sale. It is predicated on a debt, and is as appropriate
when the debtor has made no sale, whether in bulk or piecemeal, as when
he has sold in bulk. Its purpose is to establish the debt, not to establish
the right to take the goods in satisfaction of it. Newmeyer v. Mayers,
35 C. C. 145. In that case the inclusion of the vendee among the defend-
ants in the action brought within the ninety days on the debt, (which was
unsuccessful as to him but successful as to the vendor) did not constitute
a proceeding to invalidate the sale within ninety days.
One proceeding to invalidate, the sufficiency of which has been recog-
nized, is the issue of an execution within ninety days on a judgment
against the vendor, and a levy thereon, within that time, upon the goods.
Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Super. 293; Schmucker v. Lawler, 38 Super. 578;
Swanson Grocery Co. v. Terwilliger, 34 C. C. 49; Newmeyer v. Mayers,
35 C. C. 145. This presupposes the recovery of a judgment for the debt
within ninety days after the sale, a thing which is not always practicable.
It would however be practicable to issue an attachment at once un-
der the act of 1869. Would that attachment be an available proceeding to
invalidate the sale? That it is, is assumed by Bouton J. in Swanson
Grocery Co. v. Terwilliger, 34 C. C. 49; by McCarroll J. in Newmeyer v.
Mayers, 35 C. C. 145, and by Von Moschzisker J. in Albert Ochse Co. v.
Drda, 16 Dist. 49, although a contrary view was taken by Newcomb J.
15 Dist. 141. The attachment however must indicate to the garnishee
that the validity of the sale by him will be contested, or within the
ninety days the sheriff must by interpleader give this notice; -34 C. C. 49.
It has been decided that an attachment execution is not available,
since it can only be used to secure for the plaintiff, the property of th@
debtor, which is in the hands of the garnishee, a very strict and narygw
conception of the meaning of the act,-Schmucker v. Lawler, 38 Sqp.
578.
That the court may not entertain a bill in equity by the creditgQ to
declare the sale void, and to appoint a receiver to take possession of the
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goods and sell them, is decided by Von Moschzisker J. in Albert Ochse v.
Drda, 16 Dist. 409, who therein dissents from the contrary opinion in
Stowers 'Packing Co. v. Shoener, 15 Dist. 141. Arcbbald J. in the District
Court of the United States thinks that a receiver could be appointed on
a bill in equity, before the appointment of. a trustee in bankruptcy,
the proceedings in which (bankruptcy) have begun. Guarantee Title and
Trust Co. v. Pearlman, 15 Dist. 696.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the act of 1905 does not indicate the
mode in which the validity of the sale is to be attacked by the creditor. -
Schmucker v. Lawler, 38 Super. 578; Albert Ochse Co. v. Drda, 16 Dis-
trict 409.
The only point in which the case before us differs from those in which
t has been held that bringing suit within ninety days against the debtor,
for the debt, is not instituting a proceeding to invalidate the sale, is
that in this case, when the creditor brought suit against the debtor, he
notified the purchaser from the debtor that he would levy on the goods as
soon as he obtained this judgment. The judgment was not secured until four
months after the purchase from the debtor. This notice is not a "pro-
ceeding at law or equity." It gave no right to the purchaser to intervene
in the suit. He could not prevent or retard the recovery of the judgment.
The title was not questioned by the suit. It was not questioned until
a levy was made upon the goods, under the ft. fa. that was subse-
quently issued. The learned court below has properly decided that the
title of the claimant, Taylor, cannot be now invalidated in pursuance of
the act of 1905.
If there was actual fraud on the part of Taylor, the goods could
still be taken in execution, independently of the act of 1905, but this
fraud has not been found or alleged.
The case has not demanded of us a consideration of the constitutionality
of the act of 1905. That its title is sufficient, is decided in Wilson v. Ed-
wards, 32 Super. 295. That it does not violate, the 14th amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, is decided by Rice, P. J. in the
same case. That it violates no part of the state constitution is likewise
decided there, and in Feingold v. Steinberg, 33 Super. 39.
Judgment affirmed.
SARAH HARMAN V. RAILROAD CO.
geligence-Railroad Ctossing-Trespass for Personal Injuries.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
William Harman, driving a team was obliged to cross the railroad.
Within fifty feet of the track his horse, usually gentle and manageable,
took fright at something, and dashed forward to cross the track, despite
his effort to prevent: A train was coming at a great rate, fifty miles an
hour, although the crossing was near a city, andwas very often used each
day by tams. Had it been running at the rate of fifteen or twenty
miles an hour, the behavior of Harmon's horse could have been seen in
titne to arrest the train. The momentum and speed were so great that
despite the efforts of the engineer and brakeman the train could not be
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stopped soon enough to avert a collision. Harman's widow brings this
action for his death.
WORST for Plaintiff.
GILBERT for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WILLS, J.-In this case these questions present themselves. Has
the injury been caused by the negligence of the defendant? Was there
any contributory negligence of the plaintiff? Would the negligence of the
defendant, if any, have caused the accident had there been'no contributory
negligence of the plaintiff?
In approaching a crossing it is the duty of a railroad company to
sound a whistle or give some notice of an approaching train so that
travellers on or near the crossing may have reasonable opportunity to
avoid danger. It distinctly appears that an omission to ring the bell or
sound the whistle, if there was such an omission, could not have caused the
accident. Even though this duty had been performed it would have been
unavailing for the driver was unable to restrain his horse though he
knew a train was coming.
There remains to be considered simply he speed of fifty miles an
hour over a country crossing. Did it cause the accident? If so was it
negligent in the company to run the train at that rate? An exces-
sive rate of speed, though the company be negligent in maintaining
it is not a ground of recovery, unless it has alone or in conjunction
with other circumstances caused the accident.
A railroad company is permitted .to move its trains at such rate of
speed as the necessities of its business, or the requirements of the public
may make necessary, and that right is subject only to such restrictions
as may be found necessary in cities and populous towns. In the country
the traveler over the wagon road may under all circumstances provide for
his safety by compliance with the rules of law that require him to stop,
look and listen. There is no maximum rate of speed. at which a train
shall be moved in the country, or any rate of speed that is negligence
per se. 150 Pa. 76.
If a railroad company makes it safe for the public to cross the road
by providing gates or a watchman it may run its trains at any rate of
speed over such crossings it chfooses. 111 Pa. 430.
In this case if the company had provided a watchman and had been
running trains at the rate of fifty miles an hour it would simply have been
exercising a privilege allowed by law. Now assuming that a watchman
was stationed at the crossingwhen the train in question was approaching
at fifty miles an hour the company would have fulfilled the requiirements
of the law, both in regard to speed and crossing protection. If, as in
this case, the horse took fright at something and dashed madly upon the
tracks in front of the train, could the company or its servant have pre-
vented a frightened horse from running upon the tracks?
We think they could not.
If a railroad is allowed by law to run its trains forty-five or fifty
miles an hour and an accident happens which could have been prevented
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if the train was running only fifteen or twenty miles an hour we cannot
on that ground impute negligence to thd railroad.
We think such accidents are altogether unavoidable, and are not due
to the negligence of the company for fast running. Was there any con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff? He was driving a usually gentle
horse it is contended but it appears that he contributed to the accident
in driving near the tracks with a horse he supposed to be gentle when in
reality it was afraid of trains. In 49 Pa. 60 and 73 Pa. 504 we find a well
established rule that the traveller must stop, look, and listen; such stop-
ping etc. must not be merely nominal or 'perfunctory. but substantial,
careful and in good faith. Because the plaintiff in this case was pre-
vented fyom complying with the law by being suddenly pulled in front of a
train by the action of his horse which he supposed to be gentle, we can-
not impute the accident to the company. The failure to stop, look, and
listen bars the actions of the plaintiff even though the horse was beyon d
his control for it was then a trespassing animal.
In 11 W. N. C. 369 it was held that where the driver of a horse ap-
proached a railroad crossing at night and his horse was frightened by an
advancing train and dashed into the engine, killing itself and demolish-
ing the buggy, the plaintiff's loss was the result of a pure accident which
the railroad company could not have prevented.
In this case we think no care on the part of the company could have
prevented what occured, which was a pure accident unavoidable by the
company, and therefore there can be no recovery in damages by the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
There is not the slightest evidence of contributory negligence, on the
part of William Harman. His horse was usually gentle and manage-
able. He took fright at something, at what does not appear. The fright
of the horse does not presuppose his driver's negligence. He dashed for-
ward across the track, despite the efforts to restrain him. That those
efforts were miss-chosen cannot be assured, nor that other efforts would
have been more effectual.
The only question then is would the death of Harman have happened
but for the negligence of the defendant? Was it negligent? Was its
negligence the cause of the death?
The locality of the crossing was near a city. It was very often used
each day. There was a likelihood then, that someone would be in the act
of crossing, at the time of the approach of any particular train. This im-
posed the duty of giving warning of the oncoming of the train by
whistling or the ringing of a bell. So far as appears, this duty was
not neglected. It has been recognized that the rate of speed increases
or diminishes the risk of collision. If the speed is high the time after a
driver's or pedestrian's discovery of the approach of the train, before it is
upon him may be too short to allow him to escape; too short to allow the
engineer after his discovery of the object on the track to stop the train
before a collision. The greater the speed the greater the momentum D.
& L. W. R. R. v. Smith, 1 Walk. 88; P. & R. R. R. v. Long, 75 Pa. 257.
Hence, the duty of adopting a moderate speed when drawing near to a
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crossing in a populous neighborhood is recognized, and whether in view of
its populousness; of the frequency with which the crossing is used, the speed
actually employed by the railroad company, was negligently high, the
jury must decide. "Whether" said Agnew C. J. "the population is
dense or sparse, at the locus in quo, what is the likelihood of danger, and
what the rate of speed compatible with the public safety, under the
circumstances are facts which necessarily find their way out into the jury
box" Penna. R. R. v. James, 81J Pa. 193. The speed of the defendant's
train in this case was fifty miles an hour, a rate so extreme that the
court ought, almost to declare it excessive, even as matter of law, in view
of the" proven character of the vicinity. In any case it could not avoid al-
lowing the jury to determine Whether it was improper or not.-D. L. &
W. R. R. v. Smith, Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Brandtmaier, 113 Pa. 610.
The other question is, was the speed, if excessive, the cause of the
death of Harman? i. e. would he have been struck, had the speed been
reasonable; had it been, e. g. but ten or fifteen miles an hour? Harman,
had as the learned court below suggests, no contror of his team. He
might possibly have been able to leap from it, had there
been time, after he first glimpsed the train, but whether he could
have done so does not appear. It does appear that had the train been
running at the rate of twenty miles an hour, the engineer could have ar-
rested it in time to avoid the collision. This justifies us in saying that the
speed above twenty miles an hour, was the cause of it. In Pennsylvania
R. R. v. James, 811 Pa. 199, the causal relation was held to exist, when
it appeared that, had the train been running at the rate prescribed by or-
dinance, five miles per hour, the father of the child could, after perceiving
the noise of the approaching train, have snatched it from the track. That
persons on the track would have had time to leave it, between their first
perceiving the approaching train, and its overtaking tl4em, had the speed
not been excessive was thought to make the excessive speed responsible
for the death in Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33. Cf. Ellis v. R.
R. 138 Pa. 506. Cf. McWilliams v. Keim, 22 W. N. 372. In P. & R. R.
R. v. Long, 75 Pa. 257, a train going eight miles gn hour struck a child
on the tracks. Agnew C. J. considered the question soluble by the jury,
whether she was not visible to the engineer in time, if the train had been
going more slowly, to enable him to "reverse the engine before it came
upon her." The duty of maintaining in drawing near important crossings,
a "manageable rate of speed," that is, one which can allow of an arrest
of the engine by its engineer in a reasonable time in case of need, is im-
plied in Reeves v. D. L. & W. R. R. 30 Pa. 454.
We are unable therefore to reach the conclusion which the learned
court announces and the judgment is reversed with a v. f. d. n.
JOHN SELIGMAN V. WILLIAM THORPE.
Trespass-Aviation-Injury to Subjacent Property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Thorpe an aviator was flying an aeroplane at the height of five hundred
feet, when, without negligence on his part, a portion of the machinery
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broke and a piece of it fell on Seligman's house doing damage which it
would require five hundred dollars to repair. He sues for the damages.
FETTERHOOF for Plaintiff.
MAUCH for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McCLINTOCK, J.-The plaintiff in this case seeks to recover on the
ground that a trespass was committed by the sailing of the aeroplane
through the air above his house and that the measure of camages is the
injury done to his home. The defense contends that the property holder
does not own all the space above him, and secondly that the air is in the
nature of a high sea, thus giving persons the right to travel through it.
We are inclined to accept the defendants contentions .with some
slight modifications.
Lands have always been granted by and in this state in fee simple.
Lands, or the property rights therein have not been, according to author-
ity, confined to the mere crust of the earth, but have been said to extend,
-in theory, to the centre of the earth on the one extreme and to the sky
on the other. This has always-been, at least as regards the extension to
the heavens, merely theoretical, and until the exigencies of this matter
of fact and progressive century, the theory has never needed testing.
In this land of large distances the doctrine of ancient lights has never
been recognized, and since there is such an infinitely greater amount of
space for vertical rays to reach the surface unimpaired by obstruction
than for lateral rays, why should this theory exist here?
The land owner does not own the water in the stream flowing over
his land, but has merely a use of it. If this stream is navigable, he must
permit the passage of boats over it, even if, in theory, he owns the space
occupied by the water. Why should not the same apply to the space
above the earth? Give a man the right of use of so much as he needs
and let the remainder vest in the public.
The true doctrine as was suggested by a southern court, and the only
one fitted to our future condition, seems to be, that so much of the air
above a man's land as he has need of, for building, for trees, or other
purposes, is subject to his exclusive dominion and control; and an inva-
sion of this property should be a trespass. The height required by each
man must be determined by the circumstances of each case.
This doctrine is adopted by this court. The defendant was above any
line needed by the plaintiff and consequently committed no trespass by
his flight over the land.
We are livirig in a progressive and mechanical age. New inventions
are constantly coming before the people; new means of travel and trans-
portation are being perfected and in consequence the law must develop
to protect them and to protect others against them. The airship oraero-
plane, is one of these. It has been dreamed of for years. The days of
Darius Green are passed. It is now here to stay. While it is not as yet
perfected, the time is soon to come when the mastery of the air will be
completed, or as nearly so as is that of the sea. As before stated, no
man, because he owns the land, over which water flows, has the exclu-
sive ownership of it. He has a right to use it; so do others. If naviga-
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ble, the public can legally float boats upon it. The law says, "if you can
navigate water, you have a right to do so. The time is at hand when the
air is to be "navigated." It is probable that travel through the air will
supersede travel by rail or sea craft Since air has become, through
inventive genius, "navigable" why should not the same rule as applicable
to water be recognized? In this respect it is in the nature of a high sea,
and subject to many of the §ame rules. Since this is so, the defendant
had a right to sail over Seligman's land without committing a trespass.
The sinking of a ship at sea injures no property beneath it. It is
swallowed up. No damage could be estimated. But the case of a wreck
in the air might be very different. To protect the owner below the air
craft, strict rules of negligence will need to be applied. In this case no
negligence is alleged, so we will disregard that subject here, and leave it
to be decided. when occasion demands it.
Should the person whose property or person has been injured, through
no fault of his own, be made to suffer alone without any legal remedy?
While a negative answer would at first appear correct, it would not be
so; When an injury has been done another through no fault of his own,
with no negligence or malice on the part of tie person who caused the
injury, should the injured person bear the loss himself? Such is the law-
An injury to another's property, caused without negligence or malice is
damnum absque injuria. It is a wrong done for which the law provides
no remedy.
The protection and control of aerial navigation is one which vitally
affects the public. In the future before such a conquest the methods of
transportation will be revolutionized. Here as in other cases, as for
instance in the coal industry, private inconvenience must yield to public
necessity. "A rule which casts upon an innocent person the responsi-
bility of an insurer is a hard one at best, and will not be generally applied
unless required by some public policy or the contracts of the parties."
Pa. Coal Co. vs. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126. To give judgment for plaintiff
in this case would be casting such a burden upon the defendant, where
public policy not only, does not require it, but on the other hand requires
his protection. As the facts stand, the rule damnum absque injuritz
applies.
Plaintiff's counsel has cited cases in which damages have been
awarded for the dropping upon land of water from the eaves of adjoining
buildings, 110 Mass. 302; and for the throwing of stones on a man's land
from without, 2 N. Y. 159. These cases show either a negligence in con-
struction or in theory, or perhaps malice. They do not apply in this
case nor are they conclusive in this state.
The only case at all in point is that of Guilk vs. Swan, 19 Johnson 381.
Here the defendant ascended in a balloon, for show purposes; in descend-
ing he suffered an accident and was dragged through a garden, causing
some injury. He called for help and the crowd which had gathered to
watch him broke into the enclosure, causingconsiderable damage. De-
fefidant alleged he was answerable only for the damages done by his
balloon, but the court entered judgment against him for all the damage
done, on the ground that he invited the destruction of the garden by call-
ing for help. This happened in 1822, before travel by air was seriously
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considered. No need of reconsideration of old common law theories had
arisen. It is too old a case to apply at this time even if it were in point
The circumstances of this case and the one atbar are too dissimilar to ap-
ply now.
Our conclusion is that a land owner has no absolute, but merely a theo-
retical ownership of all the space above his land, that the air above the
earth is somewhat in the nature of the high seas, and consequently aero-
planes have the right to pass over the land, and in the absence of negli-
gence, any injury to the land resulting therefrom is damnum ubsque
-inuria.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
"Land hath also" says Blackstone, 2 Comm. p. 18; "in its legal sig.
nification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards, Cujus est
solum ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law." But this is
nothing but a dictum. The cases actually before courts, have concerned
acts done only a very small distance above the surface of the earth. The
inference drawn from the maxim by Blackstone is that "no man may
erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land." Ibid.
The limbs of a tree growing on B's land may be cut off by A if they
project across the boundary between B's land and his. Minor & Wurts,
Real Prop. 16. Telegraph or Telephone wires may not be streched over
A's land without his consent, unless compensation is made to him. Ibid.
But there are probably no cases in which the land-owners right has
been recognized, to prevent the passage or to obtain damages for the
passage at a great distance over the land of a bullet shot from a gun, or of
a sky rocket, or of a balloon. When the maxim was formulated, no need
was felt to distinguish between invasions of the space over lands which
were near to the surface, and invasions at great elevations. It will not
be possible to sharply distinguish the height within which, and those be-
yond which invasions will be deemed actionable. It is enough for the
present to say that a transientinvasion at the height of three or fourhundred
feet, at the present stage of civilization, cannot be deemed an action-
able trespass. To hold it so would be in the highest degree preposterous.
There are already invasions of closes, e. g. by dogs, and by travellers.who
-ind the highways impassable, for which the courts have chosen to allow
no damages. It would strike the ordinary man as eccentric and ludicrous
to hold that if an aviator flew at a great height across X's land he did
any act of which X could successfully complain.
Thorpe had exposed himself to no action, when he merely sailed within
the planes which extended upwards toward the sky through the super-
ficial boundaries of the land from the centre of the earth. An accident
however occurred while he was there. A part of the machinery fell upon
Seligman's house, but without Thorpe's negligence. Is he liable for the
injury thus caused?
There are cases which hold that for damages to A's property caused
by B without negligence, in the prosecution of a lawful business, he is
not liable to make compensation. Baran v. Reading Iron Co, 202 Pa. 274;
Pa. R. R.v. Lippincott 116 Pa. 462. There areothers which maintain that
there is such liability; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257; Houck
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v. Pipe Line Co. 153 Pa. 366; Rogers v. Phila. Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473;
Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324.
While we concede to aviators the right to navigate the air at proper
heights, we think it fit that they should do so under the condition that
for any injuries caused to the property or persons on the surface of the
earth, they should be liable to make compensation, whether they have
acted skillfully and carefully or not. The human race has thus far got
along without aerial navigation. Its use on a large scale will in any
case, lead to grave damages and frequent losses to the less ambitious and
aspiring dwellers on the soil. It is little to give then a right of compen-
sation, when the aviator can be caught, and proves solvent, whose ex-
ploits in the air have produced the mischief.
To adopt the principle that the absence of negligence would prevent
liability, would unless accompanied by the further principle that the oc-
currence of an accident should be prima facie evidence of negligence, be
highly inconvenient. The plaintiff would often have no means of knowing
what the cause of the accident was and whether there was negligence or
not, except the testimony of the aviator himself or of the passengers.
The time may come when the art and instruments of aviation will be
so far perfected that accidents will be rare. It will then be early enough
to relax the rule of liability in favor of the careful operator.
As to the measure of damages, it may be said that, the injury to the
house being reparable, the cost ok the reparation $500 will be the measure
of damages, plus the value of the use of the premises lost meantime unless
this cost exceeds the difference between the market value of the premises
before and that value after the infliction of the injury. Weaver v. Ber-
wind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195; Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co. 213
Pa. 252.
The philosophical opinion of the learned court below sufficiently vin-
dicates its conclusion that sailing through the air over a man's land is
no trespass, We are not able to go farther with it and hold that for
injury to the subjacent property there will be no liability, unless the avi-
tor has been negligent.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
